Low Propensity Voters | Power Line

No one should be surprised by the results last night in the elections held in Wisconsin and Florida. Disappointed? perhaps. Surprised? No.

Trigger warning: political science to follow. It’s a well-established phenomenon that mid-term and special elections favor the party out of power at the moment, ceretis paribus.

In 2024, Pres. Trump won Wisconsin by less than a percentage point. The Republican-backed candidate for state Supreme Court justice appears to have lost last night 45 to 55 percent, with votes still being counted. [Meanwhile, a referendum to put voter ID into the state constitution passed.]

Likewise, in two Florida congressional special elections yesterday, both Republicans won. Their victory margins (14.6 percent and 14 percent), however, were well below the Republican-winning margins last November (32 percent and 33 percent, respectively). Regardless of the narrower margins, Republicans were happy to pad their thin majority in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Some of the narrower margins in Florida can be attributed to the absence (by definition) of any incumbents in the race. But larger political forces are at work.

The myth of the “country-club Republican” dies hard. In recent election cycles (at least under Donald Trump), the Republican and Democratic parties have swapped places in terms of representing the middle- and working-classes of voter. To form governing majorities, Republicans picked up a cohort of low-propensity voters, but surrendered an advantage in low-turnout environments.

More than a decade ago I wrote about how Republican voters were more likely than Democrats to turn out to vote. I cited as support some 2008 Gallup polling (still available). Quoting myself,

In this example from a 2008 Gallup poll, in moving from all adults to registered voters, John McCain picked up two points on Barack Obama.  In moving from registered voters to likely voters, McCain picked up six more points on Obama.

As we move from the general population (all adults over 18) to those engaged enough to be registered to vote, support for Republicans increase.  Support for the GOP increases further when we narrow the screen to “likely” voters.  The more engaged a voter is, the more like that voter is to support Republicans.

The political pollster Rasmussen takes this process one step further, screening for “certain” voters.  When we move from “likely” voters to “certain” to vote voters, Republican prospects improve again.

The situation has completely reversed. Demographics supporting Democrats are much more likely to turn out. PRRI analyzed 2024 election returns and calculated the demographic groups with the highest turnout rates. They found the most overrepresented groups among voters included: high income, college graduates, nonreligious, and suburban residents.

Pew Research has done extensive polling on how different demographic groups lean politically. Pew found that Democrats enjoyed the highest levels of support from upper income, college graduates, nonreligious, and suburban residents.

The groups who are both more likely voters and more likely Democrat-supporting matches 1:1 for every almost demographic. The one exception is married voters, who are both likely to vote and more likely to support Republicans.

We have the mid-term elections coming up in 2026, many more special elections, and important state elections in New Jersey and Virginia upcoming in November 2025. Keep in mind that until 2028, the advantage lies with Democrats.

Buckle up!