“We are also going to resurrect the American shipbuilding industry,” President Donald Trump declared in his address to a joint session of Congress on March 4.
To accomplish that, the president has announced the establishment of an Office of Shipbuilding.
That announcement reflects the recognition of an issue that has been ignored for too long: The U.S. is not building enough ships at the pace required to counter growing threats abroad.
The U.S. Navy set an ambitious goal last year to reach a fleet of 381 ships, a commendable target, but with an unfortunate catch. That shipbuilding plan spans 30 years, and given the current state of the maritime industrial base, it may take even longer to be realized.
And a fleet built too late is a fleet built to fail.
Unlike during the Cold War or World War II, when the U.S. built dozens of ships per year, today’s shipyards are struggling to meet even the most modest of goals. Many of the reasons for that, however, are clear.
First, and perhaps most importantly, is the issue of procurement dollars. Across the Department of Defense, too little of the budget is allocated to procurement. In 1980, procurement was more than 2.5 times that of research, development, test and evaluation.
Today, the two categories are nearly equal. Even worse is the absurd misuse of RDT&E dollars for fraudulent initiatives and DEI programs, despite real-time threats to U.S. national security.
Low procurement budgets must be addressed immediately to ensure we can acquire more ships as soon as possible.
The defense industrial base, like any American industry, relies on market signals. In simple terms, if we do not order ships and submarines from contractors, the market will not reflect a demand for ships and submarines.
The annual defense budget for years has not sent a positive demand signal to the shipbuilding industry, and the industry has, as a result, failed to invest in infrastructure and labor.
Low demand signals also lead to the lack of skilled workers—welders, pipefitters, and naval engineers— which has stalled production significantly. Shipyards are disincentivized from hiring and retaining enough workers to work on even one submarine a year.
Derivative from labor shortages are the delays and cost overruns that plague the maritime industrial base. Construction is months and even years behind schedule across the board.
These deep-rooted issues present an enormous obstacle to America’s ability to produce warships at the scale required to deter conflict. Even worse, if the U.S. found itself in a prolonged naval war in the coming years, our current maritime industrial base would be incapable of replacing lost ships fast enough.
But this is not some far-off and distant problem, and shipbuilding must respond to what is happening now. In 2000, the U.S. Navy outnumbered China’s fleet by 108 vessels. Today, 25 year later, that advantage no longer exists—China now outnumbers the U.S. by 113 vessels.
China’s aggressive naval action and expansion has shifted the balance of power, and if the U.S. does not respond decisively, our ability to deter conflict—much less win a war—will be dangerously diminished.
Congress took a positive step in February, as it determined the first steps to improve the shipbuilding process. Through Section 1024 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, Congress passed a reform to limit the Navy’s ability to cause delays through requirement overload.
That will ensure the Navy certifies ship designs before construction even begins, substantially increasing efficiency.
One potential comprehensive solution is a modern Naval Act, similar to the Naval Act of 1938 that jump-started American shipbuilding before World War II.
So, what would a Naval Act of 2025 look like?
A modern Naval Act could:
- Advance the executive order to establish an Office of Shipbuilding and encourage cross-institutional solutions.
- Prioritize procurement, ensuring that taxpayer dollars go toward building ships now, rather than speculative projects that won’t materialize for decades.
- Create long-term demand by guaranteeing multiyear contracts for shipbuilders, allowing them to expand capacity and hire a skilled workforce.
- Expand shipyard capacity, including direct investment into the workforce through initiatives like the Navy’s proposed Shipyard Accountability and Workforce Support (SAWS) plan.
- Fund the Navy at wartime levels, recognizing that China’s expansion is already a wartime reality, even if shots have yet to be fired.
We must act decisively, provide stable funding, and allow the industry to do its job.
The Navy cannot deter war if it does not have the fleet to fight one.
The executive branch and Congress have clearly recognized this and taken initial steps, but unless we commit to a bold, aggressive shipbuilding initiative, America’s naval dominance will continue to erode.
